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Executive summary
The banking crisis in the euro area, which started in mid-2007 and has yet to be fully 
resolved, has sparked considerable debate and reform, most notably the initiation of banking 
union starting in mid-2012. But one issue that has been largely overlooked in the debate is 
the peculiar ownership and governance structures of euro-area banks. European policymak-
ers and analysts often appear to assume that most banks are publicly listed companies with 
ownership scattered among many institutional investors (‘dispersed ownership’), a structure 
in which no single shareholder has a controlling influence and that allows for considerable 
flexibility to raise capital when needed (‘capital flexibility’). Such an ownership structure is 
indeed prevalent among banks in countries such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 
This Policy Contribution shows, however, that listed banks with dispersed ownership 
are the exception rather than the rule among the euro area’s significant banks , especially if 
one looks beyond the very largest banking groups. The bulk of these significant banks are gov-
ernment-owned or cooperatives, or uniquely influenced by one or several large shareholders, 
or otherwise prone to direct political influence. 
As a result, the public transparency of many banks is low, with correspondingly low market 
discipline; they have weak incentives to prioritise profitability; their ability to shore up their 
balance sheets through either retained earnings or external capital raising is limited, result-
ing in insufficient capital flexibility; they tend to take unnecessary risks because of political 
interference; and their links with governments perpetuate the vicious circle between banks 
and sovereigns, which has been a key driver of the euro-area crisis. 
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The euro area’s significant banks
The new framework of European banking supervision, also known as the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, established the European Central Bank (ECB) as the licensing authority for all 
banks in the euro area as of 4 November 2014. As a result, and despite many lingering nation-
al idiosyncrasies (ECB, 2016a), the euro area can now be considered a single jurisdiction for 
banking sector policy.
European banking supervision distinguishes between banks labelled significant, known as 
‘significant institutions’ (SIs), and all other banks in the euro area, known as ‘less significant 
institutions’ (LSIs). SIs include all euro area-headquartered banking groups, and euro-area 
branches and subsidiaries of groups headquartered elsewhere, that have at least €30 billion 
in total assets, and others that have specific significance in their respective member states or 
because of their international interconnectedness. The ECB directly supervises SIs, while LSIs 
are supervised by national authorities under the ECB’s ‘supervisory oversight’. The ECB regu-
larly updates a list of all supervised entities, including SIs and LSIs. This Policy Contribution is 
based on the list as of 15 November 2016 (ECB, 2016c). 
Table 1: Euro-area banks 
Category Number 
of banks
Assets
€  billions % of euro area total
Euro-SIs 97 22,118 79.9 
     G-SIBs 8 10,865 39.2 
     Other euro-SIs 89 11,253 40.6 
Significant subsidiaries/branches 29 965 3.5 
    Owned by euro-SIs 4 79 0.3 
    Owned by third-country groups 25 886 3.2 
Total SIs 122 23,004 83.0 
LSIs 3,168 4,695 17.0 
Total 3,290 27,699 100.0 
Source: Bruegel based on ECB (2016b) and Schoenmaker and Véron (2016). Note: Assets are as of end-2015; the total for SIs is adjusted 
to avoid double-counting of significant subsidiaries owned by euro-SIs in Slovakia and Portugal. SIs = significant institutions; G-SIBs = 
global systemically important banks; LSIs = less significant institutions.
The euro area has 126 SIs (122 after eliminating double counting, see below), of which 97 
are euro area-headquartered banking groups (hereafter referred to as ‘euro-SIs’) and 29 are 
subsidiaries of other banking groups. Among the latter, four are owned by other euro-SIs but 
still listed separately by the ECB1, and the other 25 are owned by groups headquartered out-
side the euro area2. Another distinction is between euro-SIs that the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) lists as ‘global systemically important banks’ or G-SIBs, and all others. As of the latest 
yearly update of the FSB’s list (FSB, 2016), eight of the 97 euro-SIs are labelled G-SIBs. 
Data on each SI’s assets are as of end-2015 from Schoenmaker and Véron (2016), with 
three adjustments to account for recent transactions3. The total adds up to €23 trillion as 
shown in Table 1; the table also shows the relative importance of LSIs compared to SIs in the 
1 These are Portugal’s BPI, in the process of being taken over by Spain’s CaixaBank but still listed separately at the 
time of observation, and three Slovakian banks owned, respectively, by Italy’s Intesa Sanpaolo and Austria’s Erste 
Bank and Raiffeisen Bank International.
2 The parent groups are headquartered in Sweden (9 cases), the United Kingdom (6), the United States (4), Russia 
(2), Denmark (1), Norway (1), Switzerland (1) and Venezuela (1). 
3 Namely, the acquisition of WGZ Bank by DZ Bank in Germany; that of BPI by CaixaBank; and the merger of Banca 
Popolare di Milano and Banco Popolare to form Banco BPM in Italy. 
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euro-area system4. Table 1 illustrates the dominance of SIs5 and that euro-SI assets are almost 
equally divided between the eight G-SIBs and the 89 other euro-SIs.
Ownership and governance patterns
Information on the ownership and governance structure of each euro-SI is publicly available. 
It is compulsory for listed company shareholders to report when they cross certain thresholds 
of ownership. Information about significant shareholdings in listed banks is therefore gen-
erally available and reliable6. For unlisted banks, relevant information is generally available 
from corporate sources, such as company websites and annual reports, and, if not, from press 
reports. Using all these sources, the largest shareholders were identified for almost all banks 
in the sample, except for a handful of cooperative or family-owned groups for which only the 
broad outlines of ownership structures could be identified. 
To summarise the results, euro-area banks fall into six broad governance arrangements7: 
• ‘Dispersed’ governance: groups whose parent entities are publicly listed and in which no 
individual shareholder holds sufficient influence to unilaterally alter the bank’s direction 
and strategy8. 
• ‘Minority influence’: groups in which no single shareholder has majority control but one 
or several minority shareholders have significant leverage over the bank’s direction and 
strategy. This category covers a variety of situations and includes both publicly listed 
groups and unlisted groups whose ownership is shared among several minority share-
holders. Depending on the case, the influential minority shareholder(s) is from the private 
sector, the public sector or a not-for-profit entity. 
• ‘Private control’: groups in which one private-sector shareholder owns more than 50 per-
cent of the shares and thus has dominant control over the bank’s direction and strategy. 
The identity of the controlling shareholder varies between cases, which include individu-
als, families, foundations, investment funds and insurance or industrial groups. 
• ‘Cooperative’ governance: banks whose shareholder capital (or a majority thereof) is 
technically owned by their customers, or by a subset thereof. This category in turn covers 
diverse arrangements, with various patterns of centralisation and intermediate structures 
between the customers and the group-level entity. Unlike in the United States, where 
credit unions tend to be small, cooperative banks in the euro area can be very large (two 
4 Data on total assets of LSIs is from ECB (2016b, Table 7), with minor adjustments to account for the aforemen-
tioned mergers and acquisitions and for slight changes of classification between January and November 2016. 
In that period, State Street Luxembourg and RBS Netherlands lost their SI designation, while Citibank Holdings 
Ireland became an SI. The total SI assets shown in Table 1 differ from the total shown in ECB’s above-mentioned 
table, presumably because of slight differences in accounting conventions. (Regrettably, the ECB doesn’t publish 
the bank-level asset figures that form the basis for its aggregates, neither for SIs nor for LSIs). 
5 ECB (2017, Table 4) suggests that this dominance may be eroding, with total assets of LSIs as of end-2016 rep-
resenting 20 percent of the system’s total, compared with 17 percent as of end-2015. This increase in LSI share, 
however, might be partly due to changes in the ECB’s measurement policies or to data quality issues. 
6 Information on shareholdings in publicly listed banks presented in this Policy Contribution was retrieved from 
www.4-traders.com, consulted between 25 March and 2 April 2017. 
7 This analysis refines and expands on Table 4 in Schoenmaker and Véron (2016). 
8 This category also includes the listed Italian ‘popular banks’ that are among the euro-SIs. Following a recent 
reform, most of these comply with the principle of ‘one share one vote’, the only exception being Banca Popolare di 
Sondrio. See Valentina Za, ‘Pop Sondrio says court halts transformation into joint-stock Co’, Reuters, 16 December 
2016. 
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of the eight euro area G-SIBs are cooperatives)9. 
• ‘Public sector’ governance: banks created by (local or national) governments and/or that 
fulfill a public interest, non-commercial objective. These include national policy banks 
in some member states, dedicated to funding local government activities (eg Finland’s 
Kuntarahoitus, France’s SFIL or the Netherlands’ BNG Bank), international development 
(France’s AFD), or small businesses and innovation (bpiFrance), as well as Germany’s 
elaborate network of local savings banks (Sparkassen) and regional banks (Landesbanken) 
and other public banks such as La Banque Postale in France or Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
in Portugal.
• ‘Nationalised’ governance: banks that are currently under government control after 
being rescued during the financial crisis. In most cases, and unlike public-sector banks, 
governments plan to privatise them or (in the case of Dexia) wind them up, sometimes 
under explicit conditions imposed by the European Commission’s Directorate-General 
for Competition for banks that received state aid. 
These six categories allow for a more refined understanding of banking structures than the 
familiar distinction between listed and unlisted banks. Several categories straddle the listed/
unlisted divide. Specifically, all public-sector and privately controlled banks are unlisted, 
and by definition all ‘dispersed’ banks are listed; but the other categories include listed and 
unlisted groups. For example, Crédit Agricole has a cooperative governance structure based 
on 39 regional cooperative banks, but the parent entity, Crédit Agricole SA, is a listed com-
pany, whose dominant shareholder (with a 75 percent stake) is a corporate entity jointly 
owned by the 39 regional banks. Similarly, some nationalised banks are fully owned by their 
respective national governments, eg Belgium’s Belfius or Portugal’s Novo Banco10, but others 
are publicly listed with the government as a majority shareholder, eg the Netherlands’ ABN 
AMRO or Spain’s Bankia. 
The allocation of each bank to one of these categories is fairly unambiguous, except at 
the margin between the ‘dispersed’ and ‘minority influence’ categories, where no obvious 
threshold exists. As a rule of thumb, banks where no single entity holds more than 10 percent 
of shares have been labelled ‘dispersed’, except in cases where several significant shareholders 
(including at least one with shares above 8 percent) are likely to act in concert11. Conversely, 
BNP Paribas has been classified as ‘dispersed’ even though the Belgian government holds 
10.2 percent of the shares, because of the latter’s commitment to act as an arm’s-length share-
holder. 
Banks in the ‘dispersed’ category might also be subject to more subtle forms of control. 
A growing literature suggests that passive index funds12 that hold significant ownership 
stakes in several listed companies in the same sector might reduce competition among those 
companies (eg Levine 2015; Anton et al, 2016; Azar, Schmalz and Tecu, 2017; Gramlich and 
Grundl, 2017; Novick, 2017; Posner, Scott Morton and Weyl, 2017; Rock and Rubinfeld, 2017). 
Investors such as BlackRock, Capital Group, Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), 
State Street global Advisers (SSgA) and Vanguard have stakes of a few percent each in many 
listed banks with dispersed ownership in both the euro area and the United States, as partly 
documented in appendices A and B. The debate about the possible impact of such ownership 
patterns on company behaviour is ongoing and might be relevant for banks in the ‘dispersed’ 
9 These are BPCE and Crédit Agricole, both headquartered in France. The other euro area-based G-SIBs are 
BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, ING, Santander, Société Générale and UniCredit (FSB, 2016). 
10 At the time of observation, the Portuguese government was in the process of selling Novo Banco. 
11 The three such cases are Intesa Sanpaolo (where three regional foundations hold a total of 17.5 percent of shares), 
Bank of Cyprus and Mediobanca, for which a publicly disclosed shareholders’ agreement covers 31 percent of total 
shares. 
12 These are funds that invest in all stocks that participate in the composition of a given index, as opposed to ‘active’ 
funds that select individual stocks for their expected performance. 
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category, even though the analysis presented here is agnostic about it. 
Appendix A presents findings on each euro-SI. Table 2 summarises the findings in terms 
of governance categories. It also indicates the split between listed and unlisted groups. 
Fewer than half (42.3 percent) of euro-SIs are listed, and fewer than half the listed euro-SIs 
(15.5 percent) have dispersed ownership. Unsurprisingly, listed banks with dispersed own-
ership tend to be larger, but even so, they represent less than half (44 percent) of all euro-SI 
assets13. 
Table 3 breaks down these categories by the eight G-SIBs and 89 other euro-SIs. Among 
other euro-SIs, the shares of each governance category in the number of banks and assets are 
broadly similar, implying that, once G-SIBs are excluded, the distribution between govern-
ance categories is not strongly correlated to size (except for privately controlled banks, which 
tend to be significantly smaller than average).
Table 2: Governance structures of euro-SIs
Governance 
structure
Number of 
banks
Percent of 
banks
Assets
€  billions % of total assets
Dispersed 15 15.5 9,723 44.0
Minority influence 22 22.7 2,988 13.5
Private control 14 14.4 572 2.6
Cooperative 15 15.5 5,351 24.2
Public sector 21 21.6 2,172 9.8
Nationalised 10 10.3 1,312 5.9
Total 97 100 22,118 100
Publicly listed 41 42.3 15,229 68.9
Unlisted 56 57.7 6,889 31.1
Total 97 100.0 22,118 100.0
Source: Bruegel based on Appendix A. Assets are as of end-2015. Note: SIs = significant institutions.
Table 3: Governance structures of euro area G-SIBs and other euro-SIs (percent)
Governance 
structure
Share of G-SIBs Share of 
other euro-SIs
By number of banks By assets By number of banks By assets
Dispersed 75.0 73.6 10.1 15.3
Minority influence - - 24.7 26.6
Private control - - 15.7 5.1
Cooperative 25.0 26.4 14.6 22.1
Public sector - - 23.6 19.3
Nationalised - - 11.2 11.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bruegel based on Appendix A. Assets are as of end-2015. Note: SIs = significant institutions; G-SIBs = global systemically 
important banks.
If anything, data shown in Tables 2 and 3 underestimates the influence of governments in 
the euro-area banking sector. Beyond the ‘public sector’ and ‘nationalised’ categories, nine 
banks representing €3,055 billion in assets have a government as their single largest minority 
13 It can safely be estimated that this share would be even lower if LSIs were included. Unfortunately, the ECB does 
not publish bank-level information on LSI assets, making it prohibitively onerous to extend the analysis presented 
here to LSIs. 
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shareholder14. An additional eight banks, representing €1,597 billion in assets, have as their 
largest (minority or majority) shareholder a regional or national foundation, which is typically 
controlled or influenced by political interests (all of them are in only three countries: Austria, 
Italy and Spain)15. Taking into account the fact that cooperative bank governance models are 
also often politicised, one can reasonably presume that there is some political interference in 
the governance of at least 64 percent of all euro-SIs, representing €13.5 trillion or 61 percent of 
total assets16. 
These findings focus on ownership structures and as such cover only some aspects of the 
euro-area banks’ governance idiosyncrasies. There are also many specific legal and practical 
arrangements under which, for example, board members are assessed, selected and renewed. 
Even among companies with dispersed ownership, in at least some countries, rules and 
practices can enable a small subset of shareholders, incumbent board members, employ-
ees’ unions and/or the bank’s managers to wield disproportionate influence17. ‘Shareholder 
democracy’ is not perfect anywhere, but just like political democracy, it is more distorted 
in some jurisdictions than in others. An analysis of such differences would complement the 
results presented in this Policy Contribution. 
Unsurprisingly, these euro-area findings mask significant diversity among EU member 
states. While not the main focus of this Policy Contribution, Table 4 shows the governance 
structures of euro-SIs by country18. One must keep in mind that these findings are only a 
current snapshot of a constantly evolving reality. For example, some of the Italian banks 
now labelled ‘dispersed’ (eg UniCredit or Monte dei Paschi di Siena) would have been until 
recently in the ‘minority influence’ or ‘private control’ categories, but the stakes of regional 
foundations that dominated their governance have been diluted in successive waves of capital 
raising (and Monte dei Paschi is expected to be nationalised soon). Similarly, most Greek 
banks had been ‘nationalised’ before their capital raising of late 2015. These changes will con-
tinue. The ownership structures of 11 euro-SIs with total assets of €748 billion are expected to 
undergo significant changes before the end of 201719, and others might also change owner-
ship soon. Thus, Table 4 does not display permanent structures of national banking systems, 
at least not for all euro-area countries. 
14  These are, by decreasing order of total assets, BNP Paribas, Commerzbank, Bank of Ireland, National Bank of 
Greece, Piraeus Bank, Alpha Bank, PBB Deutsche Pfandbriefbank, Aareal Bank and Bank of Valletta. In all these 
cases except BNP Paribas, the government in question is that of the country in which the bank is headquartered. In 
all except Aareal and BNP Paribas, the bank is in the ‘minority influence’ governance category. 
15  These banks are, by decreasing order of total assets, Intesa Sanpaolo, CaixaBank, Erste Group, UBI Banca, Unicaja, 
Ibercaja, Kutxabank and Liberbank. 
16  These totals are obtained by adding the ‘cooperative’ banks, ‘public sector’ banks, ‘nationalised’ banks, and the 17 
(9+8) other groups specifically referred to. 
17  For example, UniCredit recently announced a governance overhaul to bring it closer to that of a ‘normal’ listed 
company with dispersed ownership. See M. Ferrando and A. Graziani, ‘UniCredit, una nuova governance per una 
public company europea’, Il Sole 24 Ore, 17 April 2017. 
18  As a reminder, Table 4, like other results in this Policy Contribution, presents a ‘home-country’ perspective, not a 
‘host-country’ one. In other words, the table displays the global assets of banks headquartered in the respective ju-
risdictions. A host-country perspective, by contrast, would display only the assets located in the jurisdictions, but 
of all banks irrespective of where they’re headquartered. Thus, for example, countries such as Estonia or Slovakia, 
which have no euro-SIs headquartered in their territory, do not appear in Table 4. 
19  These are Allied Irish Banks, HSH Nordbank, Nova Ljubljanska Banka, Novo Banco, SNS Bank, expected to be at 
least partly privatised in 2017; Banca Popolare di Vicenza, Veneto Banca and Monte dei Paschi di Siena, expected 
to be nationalised or resolved; Ibercaja and Unicaja, expected to be listed on the Spanish stock market; and Banco 
Mare Nostrum, expected to be merged with Bankia. 
One can reasonably 
presume that there 
is some political 
interference in the 
governance of at 
least 64 percent of all 
euro-area significant 
institutions, 
representing 61 
percent of total assets
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International perspective
This section compares the euro area’s larger banks with banks of similar size in Australia, Can-
ada, the United Kingdom and the United States, taken as representing the dispersed-owner-
ship model. The ‘large euro-SIs’ are those with total assets above €30 billion. This subsample 
comprises 84 of the 97 euro-SIs as of mid-November 2016, representing 99.3 percent of aggre-
gate euro-SI assets. A parallel sample of ‘Anglo-Sis’, comprising all banks headquartered in the 
four selected countries with total assets above €30 billion, is based on a reference ranking of 
global banks (The Banker, 2016)20. This sample consists of 53 groups, as summarised in Table 5 
(coincidentally the two samples cover about the same amount of aggregate assets).
Table 5: Anglo-SIs 
Country Number of banks Assets 
€ billions % of total assets
Australia 7 2,541 10.1
Canada 8 3,334 13.3
United Kingdom 10 7,016 28.0
United States 28 12,175 48.6
Total Anglo-SIs 53 25,066 100.0
Source: Bruegel based on The Banker (2016) and a dollar/euro exchange rate of 1.087. Note: Assets are as of end-2015. SIs = significant 
institutions.
20 The exchange rate of US$1.087 per euro used in The Banker’s ranking is adopted here. Asset totals in the list are 
based on different accounting standards in different jurisdictions; no attempt has been made here to correct for 
the corresponding distortions. See Hoenig (2016) for an attempt to do so for G-SIBs. 
Table 4: Governance structures of euro-SIs by country
Country Total euro-SI 
assets (€bns)
Dispersed Minority 
infl.
Priv. 
control
Coop. Public 
sector
Nationalised Total
France 7,365 2/45% 1/1% 1/1% 3/49% 4/5% - 11/100%
Germany 4,435 2/38% 2/14% 1/3% 4/15% 10/31% - 19/100%
Spain 3,409 4/72% 3/14% 3/5% 1/1% - 2/7% 13/100%
Italy 2,351 6/60% 4/35% 2/3% 1/2% - - 13/100%
Netherlands 2,206 1/38% - - 1/30% 2/11% 2/21% 6/100%
Belgium 747 - 1/34% 3/12% - - 2/54% 6/100%
Austria 449 - 1/45% 1/8% 4/47% - - 6/100%
Greece 342 - 4/100% - - - - 4/100%
Ireland 263 - 1/50% - - - 2/50% 3/100%
Portugal 234 - 1/32% - - 1/43% 1/25% 3/100%
Finland 159 - - - 1/79% 1/21% - 2/100%
Luxembourg 76 - - 1/43% - 1/57% - 2/100%
Cyprus 44 - 2/68% - - - 1/32% 3/100%
Slovenia 20 - - 1/20% - 2/80% - 3/100%
Malta 13 - 1/77% 1/23% - - - 2/100%
Latvia 5 - 1/100% - - - - 1/100%
Total/ave. 22,118 15/44% 22/14% 14/3% 15/24% 21/10% 10/6% 97/100%
Source: Bruegel based on Appendix A. Note: Each cell displays, for each country, the number of euro-SIs in each category and the corresponding percent share of the aggregate assets of 
the country’s euro-SIs. Cells are shaded when the asset share is above a significance threshold of 30 percent. Countries are ranked by total euro-SI assets. Assets are as of end-2015. SIs 
= significant institutions.
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The criteria for inclusion in The Banker’s ranking are not identical to the ECB’s criteria for 
designation as SIs, but the differences (and corresponding selection bias) can be considered 
insignificant. In both cases, large nonbank public institutions are excluded, such as France’s 
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations or Germany’s Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau in the euro 
area, or Canada’s Caisse de Dépôt et de Placement du Québec or Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac in the United States. Most large euro-SIs that do not appear on The Banker’s list are 
public financial institutions for which no equivalent appears to exist in the four ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
countries21. Otherwise, only five large euro-SIs22 are missing from The Banker’s list, and they 
represent only 1.0 percent of aggregate euro-SI assets. Conversely, two euro-area groups23 
with assets above €30 billion that appear on The Banker’s list are not classified as SIs by the 
ECB, presumably because both are bank-insurance conglomerates whose banking arms are 
small enough to be considered LSIs. In sum, applying the ECB’s SI criteria would have yielded 
a sample of Anglo-SIs very similar, if not identical, to that derived from The Banker’s ranking. 
In terms of ownership and governance patterns, the contrast with the euro area is evident. 
All Australian and Canadian banks in the sample except one (Canada’s Desjardins) are listed 
companies with dispersed ownership. Such banks also dominate in the United Kingdom and 
the United States. There are no public-sector banks, none under private control, and only one 
nationalised bank (Royal Bank of Scotland)24. The only unlisted groups are the cooperatives 
(one in Canada and three in the United Kingdom), which are all comparatively small. Appen-
dix B provides the full list, and Table 6 summarises the findings25. 
Table 6: Governance structures of large euro-SIs versus Anglo-SIs
Governance 
structure
Number 
of large 
euro-SIs
Euro-SI assets
Number of 
Anglo-SIs
Anglo-SI assets
€ billions
% of total 
assets
€ billions
% of total 
assets
Dispersed 15 9,723 44.3 43 21,874 87.3
Minority infl. 18 2,943 13.4 5 1,543 6.2
Private control 11 559 2.5 0 0 0.0
Cooperative 13 5,313 24.2 4 529 2.1
Public sector 19 2,156 9.8 0 0 0.0
Nationalised 8 1,269 5.8 1 1,120 4.5
Total 84 21,963 100.0 53 25,066 100.0
Publicly listed 37 15,160 69.0 49 24,537 97.9
Unlisted 47 6,803 31.0 4 529 2.1
Total 84 21,963 100.0 53 25,066 100.0
Source: Bruegel based on appendices A and B. Note: Assets are as of end-2015. SIs = significant institutions.
21 These are, by decreasing order of balance sheet size as of end-2015, NRW.Bank, HSH Nordbank, Erwerbege-
sellschaft der S-Finanzgruppe, SFIL, L-Bank, Hamburger Sparkasse, bpiFrance, Agence Française de Développe-
ment and Kuntarahoitus. In the US, for example, only two state-owned banks appear to exist, Bank of North Dako-
ta and Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico, both with total assets well under the €30 billion threshold. 
22 These are, by decreasing order of balance sheet size as of end-2015, PBB Deutsche Pfandbriefbank, Iccrea, Caisse 
de Refinancement de l’Habitat, RCI Banque and Precision Capital/Banque Internationale à Luxembourg. 
23 Germany’s Wüstenrot & Württembergische and Italy’s Mediolanum. 
24 At the time of observation, the UK government had already sold almost all of its holdings in Lloyds Banking Group. 
25 The observed differences are not about the respective sizes of both bank samples, which in any case are based 
on the same size threshold of €30 billion. For comparison purposes, if the euro-SIs sample were limited to the 53 
largest instead of 84 (namely, all those with assets above €65 billion), the proportions (by assets) would have been: 
dispersed (46 percent), minority influence (13 percent), private control (1 percent), cooperative (25 percent), 
public sector (9 percent), nationalised (5 percent) – altogether a picture very similar to that in Table 6. 
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Policy analysis and implications
The governance structures of significant banks in the euro area differ markedly from their 
equivalents in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, and listed banks 
with dispersed ownership are less prominent in the euro area than is often assumed. Ex-
ploring why euro-area banks have different governance patterns would be a highly valuable 
historical analysis but is not attempted in this Policy Contribution because these patterns 
arose under a materially different policy framework before the introduction of banking union, 
and their past drivers are thus only of limited relevance for present and future policy. For the 
same reason, this Policy Contribution also does not address the role of different governance 
structures in causing the euro-area banking crisis that started in 2007, and in the associated 
supervisory failures in most euro-area countries. 
The findings that the governance structures of most euro-area banks are potentially vul-
nerable to some form of political interference and that only a minority are listed companies 
with dispersed ownership have implications for financial stability, resilience to shocks and 
other areas of public policy. 
• First, the governance patterns make the euro-area banking system less transparent and, 
as a consequence, less subject to market discipline. Listed companies have to comply 
with much more stringent disclosure requirements than their unlisted counterparts, and 
among listed companies, those with dispersed ownership have more incentives to be 
transparent than those controlled by one shareholder or shareholding group. Many stud-
ies of the euro-area banking system (including most of its coverage by investment banks) 
focus on publicly listed entities, thus missing about two-fifths of the total as measured 
by assets (if LSIs are included). Other incentives for transparency apply to all banks, for 
example, the scrutiny of credit rating agencies or the disclosure requirements under the 
so-called third pillar of the Basel capital framework, but they are not powerful enough. 
Correspondingly, there is less public and market pressure on banks to respond to changes 
in the market environment (or market discipline) in the euro area than in other jurisdic-
tions such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. 
• Second, all things being equal, euro-area banks have weaker incentives to prioritise 
profitability among their objectives, since minority investors in a dispersed-ownership 
structure tend to focus most on profits and dividends. As a result, euro-area banks typi-
cally take longer to reconstitute their capital buffers after a shock, even when they are able 
to retain comparatively more of the profits they make. Simultaneously, the competitive 
pressure from banks that don’t prioritise profits might erode the profitability of even those 
banks that respond to capitalist incentives, a familiar complaint of commercial bankers in 
Germany, for example. 
• Third, many of the ownership structures make it more difficult for euro-area banks to 
raise fresh capital externally when they need it. Controlling or influential shareholders 
often don’t want to have their stakes reduced and might resist calls for more capital for 
that reason26. In some cooperative or public-sponsored banking structures, it is difficult, 
in certain cases even impossible, to raise external capital in the form of common equity. 
For a long time this was a key challenge for many Spanish savings banks (cajas de ahorros) 
that contributed to their chronic undercapitalisation. In state-owned banks, their gov-
ernment shareholder is often constrained when they need additional capital, because of 
fiscal stress, the unpopularity of taxpayer-funded bailouts and/or the EU state aid control 
framework. Listed banks with dispersed ownership have comparatively greater capital 
flexibility. 
26 Of course, shareholders of all banks tend to resist capital increases that would dilute their share of future profits. 
But in cases of dispersed ownership, there is typically less resistance against the related loss of control. 
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• Fourth, the politicisation of management that results from many euro-area banks’ owner-
ship and governance structures often affects their operations. It can lead banks to deviate 
from ‘commercially driven’ business decisions, for example, lending more to preferred 
borrowers or sectors or to the government itself, and/or during economic downturns (eg 
Sapienza, 2004; Bertay, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2015; Gropp and Saadi, 2015). This 
can in turn lead to detrimental trade-offs in terms of risk taking and profitability. More 
straightforwardly, bank politicisation can lead to inefficiency, for example, by driving an 
outsized influence of staff unions in the bank’s decisions or by tilting recruitment policies 
towards beneficiaries of political patronage. To be sure, incompetence and poor risk 
assessment are regularly observed in all kinds of banks, including the most commercially 
run, but they can still be expected to be somewhat correlated with political interference. 
• Fifth, the structures of euro-SIs may perpetuate the vicious circle between banks and 
sovereigns, which is now widely identified as a key driver of the euro-area crisis, in a way 
that is less obvious but not necessarily less powerful than visible financial linkages such 
as national deposit guarantees or bank-held portfolios of home-country sovereign debt. 
Governments are likely to have stronger implicit guarantees for banks that they are linked 
to through the banks’ governance and ownership. Conversely, banks owned or otherwise 
directly influenced by governments tend to display higher home bias in their portfolios of 
sovereign debt (De Marco and Macchiavelli, 2016). 
As for possible macroeconomic benefits from banks owned or influenced by the state, evi-
dence is mixed at best. Even when lending by such banks is less procyclical (or in some cases, 
countercyclical) – ie their lending rises during economic downswings – state banking appears 
to be costly and inefficient compared with other countercyclical tools (Bertay, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2015)27. 
Shifting toward a greater share of listed banks with dispersed ownership can thus bring 
benefits to the euro-area banking system, particularly in terms of capital flexibility and the 
gradual elimination of the bank-sovereign vicious circle. In particular, this analysis suggests 
more reasons to privatise banks in public ownership, including those nationalised during 
the crisis, and to sell government-held minority stakes, beyond any obligations that member 
states might have under the EU state aid framework. Such sales should be made to the highest 
suitable bidder at any moment when market conditions are not evidently adverse, even if the 
sale price doesn’t allow a government to recoup all losses from past interventions. 
More generally, EU policymakers should avoid creating or maintaining any distortions 
that undermine the dispersed-ownership model. A review of such distortions in the euro area 
is beyond the scope of this Policy Contribution. The ECB’s prudential supervision appears 
to be broadly neutral in this respect, in contrast to many past supervisory practices at the 
national level (Schoenmaker and Véron 2016), despite controversies about its possible pref-
erential treatment of individual banks28. But the prudential rulebook is still far from fully har-
monised (ECB 2016a), and national prudential idiosyncrasies might linger that favour specific 
governance structures. EU legislators should use the ongoing revision of the framework for 
bank capital requirements to better align with the global standards set by the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision, including stricter regulatory definitions of common equity, the 
elimination of capital double counting between banking and insurance activities of the same 
group and dismantling regulatory privileges to specific categories of borrowers (see BCBS, 
27 A pre-crisis literature review by Levy Yeyati, Micco and Panizza (2005) concluded that “we still do not know enough 
to pass a final judgment on the role of state-owned banks and hence more research is needed”. Much of this compar-
ative literature is focused on emerging markets. 
28 See, for example, Laura Noonan, Caroline Binham and James Shotter, ‘Deutsche Bank received special treatment 
in EU stress tests: German lender’s result was boosted by a special concession agreed by the European Central 
Bank,’ Financial Times, 10 October 2016; and Case Study 1 on Monte dei Paschi di Siena in Transparency Interna-
tional EU (2017). 
Shifting toward a 
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2014). EU legislation should also allow supervisors sufficient discretion to impose require-
ments for additional capital above the regulatory minimum, known as Pillar II requirements 
in the Basel Committee’s jargon29. In turn, euro-area supervisors should rigorously enforce 
the capital requirements framework, not only the ECB on SIs but also national supervisors on 
LSIs. 
Beyond the prudential framework, policymakers at national and European levels should 
identify and dismantle other aspects of policy, especially (but not limited to) tax arrange-
ments, that may distort banking groups’ structures and be unfavourable to listed banks with 
dispersed ownership. Some of these distortions may be significant. 
None of these recommendations go against the organising principles of the euro area’s 
existing banking policy framework. Public authorities will have to be persistent in imple-
menting them, given the heavy legacy of links – not only financial but also political and social 
– between many of the euro-area banks and their local or national political systems. Since 
the initiation of euro-area banking union, many banks have gradually returned to soundness. 
More effort is needed, however, for the system to acquire sufficient capital and managerial 
flexibility, so that it can respond more nimbly to future shocks than it has in the recent past. 
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